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INTRODUCTION
We have received many comments, both first hand and second hand, about our paper "What Does
a Negawatt Really Cost? Evidence From Utility Conservation Programs" which was published in the
Energy Journal in 1992.' Some of these comments have been favorable while others have been critical.
This note is an effort to respond to what we believe are the most important criticisms of our study. In
this context we will discuss a recent evaluation of the Bonneville Power Administration's (BPA)
Residential Weatherization Program which was prepared by Oak Ridge National Laboratory and published
in December 1992 (Brown and White (1992)).2 This program is especially interesting to examine in light
of what we feel to be the most significant criticisms of our earlier work. These criticisms relate to the
effects of improved measurement and evaluation techniques, program maturity, learning, and economies
of scale on program costs and performance. Because the BPA program has been in existence since 1980
and has been accompanied by a reasonably careful cost accounting and ex post measurement protocol, its
experience provides some evidence regarding the importance of these factors.
Almost nobody who offered us comments questioned the validity of the computations that we
presented in our paper. Many people agreed that the cost accounting and energy savings measurement
issues that we identified were indeed significant problems that needed to be addressed more
comprehensively. There was also broad agreement that the actual costs per kWh saved that are being
'The Energy Journal, Volume 13, No. 4, 1992, 41-74. The results of this research are summarized in our paper
"What Does Utility-Subsidized Energy Efficiency Really Cost?", Science, Vol. 260, April 16, 1993, pp.2 81/370.
2Marilyn A. Brown and Dennis L. White, Evaluation of Bonneville's 1988 and 1989 Residential Weatherization
Program: A Northwest Study of Program Dynamics, ORNL/CON-323, December 1992.
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achieved by utility conservation programs are significantly higher than the most optimistic technical
potential (TP) estimates that are frequently cited in the media, before state regulatory agencies, and in
other government forums. With one exception (Amory Lovins), everyone agreed that the Lovins/RMI
numbers, in particular, drastically understate the true costs of energy conservation programs. Indeed, a
number of people told us (confidentially, of course) that the Lovins/RMI numbers were becoming an
embarrassment to the energy conservation community because they had no relationship to reality.
Most of the criticisms that we received focused instead on whether or not our sample is
representative of current utility experience and, more importantly, whether our results are indicative of
the future performance of utility programs. Unfortunately, these criticisms were long on speculation about
the present and future and short on hard empirical evidence.
Neither the criticisms that we have received, nor more recent utility reports or studies that we have
reviewed, lead us to change any of the conclusions that we reached in our paper. The total cost of energy
efficiency improvements facilitated by utility programs are, on average, significantly higher than the
numbers frequently quoted and used in the media, before regulatory agencies, and in utility planning
models (e.g., the RMI and EPRI numbers referred to in our paper and similar TP studies). Proper
accounting of program costs, accurate measurement of energy savings attributable to the programs, and
proper consideration of the interaction between these programs and normal market processes would reduce
significantly the overall societal benefits attributed to utility conservation programs; as a result, some
programs that appear cost effective on paper would be found to be wasteful in reality. While we think
that there is more than a free snack out there that utilities can help to capture. the free banquet with caviar
and champagne that the public is often promised is not likely to be achievable with current practices.
We have seen and heard evidence that utilities are responding to our findings by improving cost
accounting, energy savings measurement techniques, and evaluation protocols. We do not find this
surprising since responsible utilities and regulators should respond to the infirmities in energy savings
measurement and program evaluation techniques that we identified. Of course, we would not have
bothered with our study if we had not expected that it would have a positive effect on the quality of these
programs by leading utilities and regulators to question some of the assertions of energy conservation
gurus.
However, we have not yet seen any hard evidence that leads us to believe that the broad adoption
of better cost accounting and energy savings measurement techniques will change our basic conclusions
about the real costs of utility-sponsored energy conservation programs. Better cost accounting and
measurement protocols will have two countervailing effects. First, accounting for all of the costs and
adjusting engineering estimates of energy savings with credible ex post measures of actual savings will
work to increase the measured cost per kWh saved compared to TP estimates and the costs of energy
savings currently reported by many utilities. Second, better measurement techniques could help to refine
utility conservation programs so that the incidence of expenditures that are not cost effective and the
burden of program costs on general ratepayers are reduced. While this would certainly be a welcome
outcome, these refinements will have to be very significant to compensate for the current practice of
underestimating costs and overestimating savings.
A number of our critics have argued that the data upon which we have relied may be
representative of the past, but are not representative of the future and that the future is very bright indeed.
We recognize, of course, that it is easier to examine what has happened in the past than it is to predict
what will happen in the future. We must point out, however, that many conservation advocates
conveniently neglected to inform anyone about the "transition problems" that would have to be addressed
when they promoted these programs in the late 1980s and induced utilities to spend billions of dollars in
the 1990-91 period covered by our data. Absent credible empirical support we see no reason to assume
that the projections that they are making in 1993 for the 1995-96 period will be any more accurate than
the predictions that they made in 1987 for 1990 and 1991. Moreover, while the notion that there will be
significant cost savings due to better information, learning, and economies of scale is theoretically
appealing, it is also possible that utilities have gone after the cheapest conservation opportunities first (the
low hanging fruit) and that it will get more costly over time to achieve energy conservation goals. The
evidence from BPA's Residential Weatherization Program, as we discuss below, is much more consistent
with the latter hypothesis than with the learning by doing hypothesis.
SHOULD UTILITIES BE PROMOTING ENERGY CONSERVATION?
There is one issue that we want to put to rest before we address some more technical issues. We
have read a number of papers and received a number of comments that suggest that some people have
interpreted our paper as arguing that utilities have no role in promoting cost effective energy conservation
investments by their customers. This represents a misinterpretation of the implications of our analysis and
of our conclusions. We believe that utilities do have a useful role to play in promoting cost effective
energy conservation. Our papers simply argue that if utilities are going to spend general ratepayer money
to finance energy conservation they are going to have to pull their socks up. In particular, they must
make a more serious effort to estimate customer and utility conservation costs, to develop and apply
credible techniques to measure the energy savings achieved, to account for changes in service quality, to 0
account properly for free riders, and to design their programs so that market barriers are reduced with the
smallest possible impact on overall rate levels. Furthermore, it is important that utilities make rate design
changes that better align prices and marginal costs so that electricity consumers get the right price signals
and that utilities identify the most efficient mechanisms for getting their customers to invest in cost
effective energy conservation opportunities.
While we believe that utilities do have a potentially important role to play in facilitating the
diffusion of cost effective energy conservation opportunities, we see serious deficiencies in the way many
of these programs have been conceptualized and structured. In particular, we think that the au courant
framework of "integrated least cost planning" that views consumer conservation investments as a "utility
resource" that utilities must "acquire" from their customers is the source of a lot of sloppy thinking (and
wasteful expenditures) and is unlikely to lead to satisfactory outcomes in the long run. Furthermore, as
competition evolves in the electric power industry this approach, which leads to higher rates and pervasive
cross-subsidies, will simply be unsustainable.
Energy conservation should be conceptualized as a customer service and a customer resource, not
as a utility resource that is equivalent to a utility "supply source." The customer will own the conservation
devices, decide how to utilize them, and when to scrap them. Nobody has yet invented a "negawatt
meter" to measure energy savings in a way that is remotely equivalent to a meter that measures the kWhs
that come out of a power plant and into a customer's home or business. Measurement problems may be
a serious market barrier, but these barriers can only be overcome by improving energy savings
measurement capabilities, at least in a statistical sense, not by making up numbers. The "integrated least
cost planning" framework makes it too easy to forget that the consumer is generally in the best position
to forecast the use of equipment placed in her home or business and to evaluate the overall benefits and
costs of investments in conservation when presented with the information necessary to make these
evaluations. Placing the utility in the position of deciding how millions of customers should use
electricity, and then using general ratepayer funds to subsidize consumers so that they behave in ways that
some engineering model says they should behave, reflects a central planning mentality that is doomed to
failure.
A decentralized customer service and customer resource perspective naturally leads one to focus
a lot more on why consumers behave as they do and how utility initiatives of different types are likely
to affect consumer behavior and ameliorate real market imperfections. This framework recognizes that
the payments that consumers are required to make for energy conservation investments made on their
behalf play an important selection role that makes it possible to exploit the "hidden information" that
customers have about their energy use patterns and investment plans. Customers who bear the costs of
conservation will have an incentive to agree to pay only for truly cost-effective investments. Thus, the
arguments about who should pay for utility conservation programs do not only raise equity issues (cross-
subsidies, non-participant burdens, etc.), but raise very important efficiency issues.
An approach to utility conservation programs that requires customers to pay the bulk of the costs
of conservation investments made on their behalf, in one way or another, out of the savings that they
realize or expect to realize, makes it necessary to convince customers that the savings are really there
when all relevant factors are taken into account. This approach will lead to real energy savings rather than
just paper savings and will relieve regulators of the very difficult task of measuring actual savings,
imputing customer costs, dealing with free riders, and changing customer behavior over time. It will also
require utilities to think about the evolution of their conservation programs into real businesses where the
bill for conservation services provided to Mrs. Smith is sent to Mrs. Smith for payment and not divied
up and sent to all of her neighbors. In the end we want least cost outcomes, not nice computer printouts
produced by integrated least cost planning software.
IS OUR SAMPLE UNREPRESENTATIVE?
It has also been argued that our paper is based on an unrepresentative sample of "immature"
conservation programs. The implication is that if we had examined a more representative sample of utility
programs we would have come up with different results. This criticism is simply unfair. The appendix
to our paper lists the names of the utilities included in the sample. Several of these utilities have had
conservation programs in place, especially for residential customers, for nearly a decade (e.g. Long Island
Lighting). Others are often pointed to as conservation leaders in the utility industry (e.g. Central Maine
Power, Massachusetts Electric, and PG&E). To the extent that our sample is biased it is probably biased
toward the more mature and highly regarded programs. As our discussion of the BPA weatherization
program will make clear, the results for what is probably the most mature and most studied energy
conservation program in the country support rather that refute our primary findings and conclusions.
Critics have pointed to a more recent study by Flanigan and Weintraub3 as providing a more
representative sample of utility programs and results that are inconsistent with our own. These critics are
wrong. Flanigan and Weintraub have assembled data for a sample of utility programs that were
prescreened as being "successful" and "the best." 60% of the utilities included in our sample have
programs that are included in the Flanigan and Weintraub sample, including all of those that we had
identified ourselves as being highly regarded. Unlike Flanigan and Weintraub, however, we examined
all of the conservation programs for the utilities we selected not just those that these utilities identified
as being successful. We also included utilities that were not generally known as being "the best."4
F&W's findings are, with one important exception, not very different from our own. The cost
per kWh saved computed based on the cost and savings numbers provided to them by utilities varies
widely, in their case from a fraction of a cent to nearly 12 cents per kWh saved.5 They recognize that
proper accounting for actual energy savings achieved by these programs is very important, that the care
with which savings are measured varies widely across utilities, and that "...just when you think you've got
significant levels of savings, you unfortunately may not!" They commend two utilities for doing an
excellent job in measuring actual net savings. One utility "takes credit" for 56% of engineering estimates
and the other 28%. They say that "caution must be taken to determine whether savings are based on
3T. Flanigan and J. Weintraub, "The Most Successful DSM Programs in North America," The Electricity Journal,
May 1993 (forthcoming).
4Programs for some of these utilities also made it on to Flanigan and Weintraub's list of "the best" utility
programs. The sample also includes Canadian utilities, at least one of which has been critivized extensively for the
waste and inefficiency associated with its conservatiuon program.
5Since we did not limit our own analysis only to programs that had been prescreened for success we find a
substantially larger variance. Nevertheless, 60% of the utilities in our sample have at least one program in Flanigan
and Weintraub's sample. However, we examined all of the programs of those utilities represented in the Flanigan
and Weintraub study not only those selected by the utilities as "successes."
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engineering estimates...or whether process and impact evaluations have been conducted, and whether the
savings have been adjusted for free ridership, unusual weather, snapback..., measure persistence and
attrition, etc." (p. 54). Our papers make exactly the same points.
F&W also appear to recognize that the costs reported by the utilities in their sample are not
directly comparable because they pay different fractions of the total cost of the conservation measures
included in the programs. Indeed, F&W report only the costs incurred by utilities, consciously ignoring
customer costs, which they recognize may be large (page 60).
Unfortunately, these important points are ignored in F&W's analysis of "low cost energy savings"
(pp. 62-63). Meaningful measurement of the cost of energy saved by utility conservation programs should
include all of the utility and customer costs incurred in connection with the programs. It should also
reflect accurate measurement of the actual savings achieved. The cost of saved energy figures reported
by F&W generally satisfy neither of these criteria.
F&W calculate the cost per kWh saved by the programs in their sample using the energy savings
and program cost information reported by the utilities. All we can infer from the data that they present
is that, on average, the cost per kWh savings figures that they report are likely to understate significantly
the true total cost of these programs. Precisely how significantly the reported cost per kWh saved will
understate the true cost will vary from program to program. The primary problems with F&W's effort to
put a cost effectiveness twist on the cost per kWh saved numbers they report are:
(a) The energy savings reported for many of the utility programs are based on engineering
estimates of energy savings rather than careful ex post measurement. As we have emphasized in
our earlier work, and F&W appear to recognize elsewhere in their paper, these savings numbers
are likely to be "derated" when careful measurement protocols are put in place. The two
exemplary programs that they identify have discounted ex ante engineering estimates significantly.
These discounts are typical of programs that use sound ex post measurement techniques. Few of
the programs that are common to our samples have adopted such measurement techniques,
however. F&W provide no indication that many other programs in their sample do not suffer
from the same measurement problems. As a result, most of the cost per kWh figures reported are
likely to embody a significant overestimate of the energy savings achieved resulting in an
associated underestimate of the cost per kWh saved.
(b) F&W include only reported utility costs and exclude customer costs. It makes absolutely no
sense to exclude customer costs when performing a cost effectiveness analysis. This approach
would violate the criteria for measuring cost effectiveness adopted by every state regulatory
agency of which we are aware. As a result, the cost per kWh saved figures reported F&W are
biased downward even further.
(c) F&W accept uncritically the costs reported to them by utilities as fully reflecting all of the
costs the utility itself incurs in connection with these conservation programs. But our analysis,
which includes several programs in the F&W sample, found that many utilities did not account
fully even for all of their own costs. The failure to include all utility costs again biases downward
the cost per kWh figures reported.
Of course, even if F&W had included only those utility programs that fully accounted for all
utility and customer costs costs and provided accurate measures of the energy savings the programs
achieved, they have not presented enough information to perform a proper cost effectiveness analysis.
They have no utility-specific avoided cost information which is necessary to perform such an analysis.
We eschewed making cost effectiveness judgements in our work due both to the infirmities of the
information available to make credible calculations of the cost per kWh saved and the difficulties of
integrating such information with avoided cost information for a large number of utilities.
WILL UTILITY PROGRAMS PERFORM BETTER IN THE FUTURE THAN IN THE PAST?
As we have already mentioned, several commentators have suggested that while our evidence may
be representative of what has happened in the past, it is not representative of how utility conservation
programs will perform in the future. They argue that utilities are getting better at the conservation
business, accounting for all costs more systematically, and measuring energy savings and free riders more
accurately. Better information, learning by doing, and economies of scale, it is argued, will help to drive
down the costs of utility energy conservation initiatives over time. While the Lovins/RMI numbers do
not represent realistically achievable goals, it is argued that energy savings and associated program costs
consistent with the EPRI numbers are an achievable goal.
We are optimists and are inclined to believe that things will get a lot better in the future if utilities
and regulators respond to the lessons learned from experience. However, we have seen little evidence to
convince us that this happy prediction of the future is based on anything other than blind faith. The best
that we can say is that it is certainly too early to tell and, as we will discuss presently, there is evidence
to suggest that improvements in cost accounting, measurement of energy savings, and the benefits of
experience will not lead to better ex ante projections of the costs of conservation "resources" used for
planning purposes or to progressively lower measured costs of meeting conservation goals.
We do want to note that several of the utilities that we included in our survey, as well as others
for which we have obtained some information subsequent to our study, have taken the issues that we have
addressed seriously. They are paying more attention to cost accounting issues, introducing and refining
protocols to measure savings actually achieved, and evaluating the evolution of the market to account for
free riders. Efforts are being made to drop programs that are not cost effective. More and more
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regulators and utilities are coming to recognize that it is important to require customers to make a
significant contribution to the costs of the investments made on their behalf, both for incentive reasons
and to moderate the rate impacts associated with general ratepayer funding of conservation subsidies. We
believe that our work has made at least a modest contribution to stimulating this evolution.
All of this being said, the progress being made in dealing with these issues, especially with regard
to measuring energy savings and accounting for free riders, is still relatively slow. Developing good
delivery mechanisms and adequate measurement and evaluation programs can take many years. Further,
a regulatory requirement to rely on ex post measurement protocols rather than ex ante engineering model
predictions necessarily takes time to implement effectively. Several people, for example, pointed to
California as a state where, subsequent to the initial circulation of our paper, the Commission decided to
require utilities to adopt comprehensive ex post measurement and evaluation techniques. We agree that
this is a good development. However, this fact was apparently presented to us as evidence that our study
is not representative of current utility programs, and by implication, that this meant that our conclusions
are inapplicable to current and future programs. The logic of this argument escapes us. Furthermore,
because developing these protocols takes time, the California Commission's rules are not yet in effect for
current programs and approved ex post measurement protocols developed in response to the Commission's
order have not yet been integrated into the utility programs. As a result, more recent data for California
continues to reflect whatever strengths and weaknesses existed during the period covered by the data in
our study.
EVIDENCE FROM THE BPA RESIDENTIAL WEATHERIZATION PROGRAM
A recent evaluation of BPA's Residential Weatherization Program can help to shed some factual
light on some of these issues.6 The BPA has been running a residential weatherization program for
6Brown and White (1992), Ibid.
customers with electrically heated homes since 1980. This is the only program of which we are aware
that has been in operation for such a long period of time. The program has applied high standards to cost
accounting, measurement of energy savings, and overall program evaluation. The BPA accounts both for
utility (BPA + host utility) costs and customer costs. It also accounts for certain administrative costs.
Unlike many other utility programs, the BPA program has been concerned about measurement issues from
its inception. Accordingly, each cohort of participants has been matched with a control group of non-
participants. The program then makes use of ex ante engineering models to predict participant savings
for planning purposes as well as ex post measurement of savings derived from comparisons between the
participants in the program and the control group to evaluate actual program performance ex post. These
comparisons between participant and control groups have been made both for the first year following the
installation of weatherization equipment and in two subsequent years as well. This makes it possible to
examine whether the savings measured for the first year persist over at least the early part of the expected
life of the capital investments made to conserve electricity. Additional stability and comparability in the
data results from the fact that measurement and evaluation has been the responsibility of Oak Ridge
National Laboratory, probably the most experienced group in this business, for many years. While we
are not entirely comfortable with the way the control groups are selected and utilized, the only component
of our list of desirable program attributes that is missing from the BPA program is an explicit accounting
for free riders.
The BPA program provides financial incentives to residential, electric space heat customers to
install a variety of measures to increase energy efficiency. "The underlying assumption of Bonneville's
weatherization efforts is that installation of retrofit measures will lead to substantial reductions in
residential energy use, and that the value of these savings will justify the Bonneville, utility, and household
costs of implementation." (Brown and White, page 1.1) The program is typical in that it relies on rebates
provided by BPA and the host utility, with only modest customer contributions required. Customer
contributions accounted for 22% of program costs (including administrative costs) in 1988 and 26% in
1989. The BPA's efforts in this area began with a pilot program in 1980. All together there are six
"program cohorts" that have been analyzed. The most recent analysis focuses on the 1988 and 1989
programs.
The 1991 Northwest Conservation and Electric Power Plan7 , which covers the BPA region, lists
single family residential weatherization as a "resource" with an expected cost of 3.4 cents per kWh (real
levelized cost in $1991).s This is very close to the cost reported by EPRI for residential space heating
conservation opportunities as reported in Figure 1 in our Energy Journal paper and is derived from
engineering analyses that are not unlike those relied upon by RMI and EPRI. Brown and White (1992)
also indicate that BPA's regional ceiling price for conservation "resources" is 5.9 cents per kWh saved
(again real levelized cost in $1991). 9 We take this to be BPA's assessment of the regional avoided cost
of new electricity supplies against which conservation investments are to be compared for cost
effectiveness. Thus, if the ex ante engineering assumptions of program costs used for planning purposes
are a good approximation to the actual cost per kWh saved achieved by the program, expenditures on
residential weatherization induced by the program should be very cost effective. The question is how do
the ex ante projections compare to the ex post performance of the program?
Table 1 provides some information drawn from Brown and White (1992) on the measured cost
per kWh saved and the relationship between pre-retrofit estimated savings based on audits and engineering
models and the post-retrofit measured savings based on comparisons between participants and controls.
' 1991 Northwest Conservation and Electric Power Plan, Volume 1, page 15, Northwest Power Planning Council,
Portland, Oregon.
8The number reported in the publication is 3.2 cents/kWh saved. This appears to be in S 1990. We have adjusted
this value and all others reported below to reflect $1991 price levels (using the CPI) so that the numbers are
comparable with one another and with those reported in our paper.
9 The number in Brown and White is 5.6 cents per kWh saved, expressed in $1990 (p. 2.11).
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The first column reports the estimated life-cycle costs for the 1988 and 1989 weatherization programs
based on the ex post measured savings and assuming that measured savings for the first post-retrofit year
persist over the entire expected life of the measures. The second column contains similar figures that have
been adjusted to reflect deterioration in measured program savings over time. We will return to this
column presently. The third column lists BPA's avoided cost ceiling. The final column is the ratio of
ex post savings calculated by comparing the participant and control groups and the ex ante engineering
estimates of the energy savings achieved by the program.
Let us start our discussion of Table 1 with the fourth column. It is evident that the ex post
measured savings are substantially less than the engineering estimates. Measured savings are only 30%
to 40% of the savings projected ex ante by the engineering models.'" Moreover, in comparing the gross
savings based on billing records with the engineering predictions for each participant, Brown and White
find that the correlation between the two is only 0.1 (pp. 4.2 and 6.2). Thus, despite many years of
experience both with ex ante forecasting and ex post measurement, BPA is still using engineering models
that perform poorly both in tracking individual usage patterns and in estimating actual savings." This
is consistent with the conclusions in our papers. Experience and program maturity does not yet appear
1o Assuming measurements are accurate, the difference between measured and projected savings can be broken
down into two components: actual forecast error and unobserved conservation by members of the control group.
If members of the control group install conservation devices on their own (i.e., naturally occurring conservation),
then the energy savings estimated by a measurement program will correctly reflect the aggregate energy savings
resulting from the program. With a well-chosen control group, the naturally occurring conservation in the control
group should exactly offset the naturally occurring conservation that would have occurred in the treatment group (i.e.,
free riders). The measured savings thus accurately reflect the net aggregate effect of the program. To calculate net
energy savings per device, the number of devices must be adjusted downward to eliminate free riders. Measured
savings divided by this reduced number of devices yields the correct savings per device. To calculate costs per kWh,
as reported in the text, measured savings are the appropriate denominator. The appropriate numerator, however, is
total costs less the costs that free riders would have incurred themselves. Since the ORNL study does not estimate
free riders, we have been unable to make that adjustment here.
These calculations would be complicated if "free drivers" are also responsible for conservation in the control
group. In general, we are skeptical of the "free driver" argument, although it is obviously an empirical issue.
" We are puzzled and troubled by the fact that experience has not improved the accuracy of the engineering
models.
to have solved this problem.
Let us turn next to the first column in Table 1. This column displays the measured cost per kWh
saved for the 1988 and 1989 programs based on total program costs (BPA, host utility, customer and
administrative costs) and the net measured savings for the first post-retrofit year attributable to the
conservation program. The net measured savings for the first post-retrofit year are assumed to persist over
the life of the conservation measures. The measured cost per kWh saved is 5.5 cents/kWh ($1991) for
the 1988 program and 9.1 cents/kWh for the 1989 program. The 5.5 cent figure is 62% higher than the
3.4 cent value used by the Northwest Power Planning Council for planning purposes. The 9.1 cent figure
is 168% higher than the 3.4 cent cost used for planning purposes. Both the 1988 and 1989 measured costs
far exceed the TP values reported by EPRI for residential heating conservation opportunities. The 1988
program is barely cost effective compared to the BPA's 5.9 cent ($1991) avoided cost ceiling, while the
1989 program fails the cost effectiveness test by a significant margin.
Contrary to the assertions of some of our critics, these high measured costs and the large
differences between measured costs and engineering estimates cannot be attributed to program immaturity,
startup problems, or a failure to consider economies that result from learning by doing. BPA's program
has been in existence for a decade and has been studied and refined more extensively that almost any
conservation program of which we are aware. Indeed, the experience with the BPA weatherization
program since 1980 makes it clear that one cannot assume that costs will necessarily fall over time. This
is an empirical issue that can only be resolved by analyzing the relevant data.
Table 2 reports the measured cost per kWh saved computed based on ex post comparisons between
participants and control groups for each of the six BPA program cohorts studied since 1980. Let us focus
initially on the first column, which presents information on the measured cost per kWh saved as reported
by Brown and White (in $1991) in the first post-retrofit year for each program cohort. The data make
it clear that the cheapest savings were achieved in the earliest years. Program costs in the post-1983
cohorts are significantly higher than in the earliest cohorts and have increased steadily over time. If the
BPA is getting better at delivering conservation services it must then be that it is getting harder to find
cost effective conservation opportunities over time as the "low hanging fruit" is picked and BPA must
climb higher up the tree to find fruit worth picking. There are a variety of reasons why this might
happen, including the diffusion of conservation investments by consumers through ordinary market forces 0
as they respond to higher electricity prices and the increased availability of information about conservation
opportunities.
Unlike many other programs, the BPA tracks energy use by both participants and the control
groups in the second and third post retrofit years. This makes it possible to examine the persistence of
program savings over time and to test the validity of cost estimates that assume that first year savings
persist over the entire life of the measures. Table 3 displays the net measured savings for each program
cohort by year as reported by Brown and White
Focusing only on column 1, we see that the first year measured annual energy savings that the
programs have achieved has declined over time. It is also the case that annual pre-retrofit consumption
of both participants and non-participants is much higher in the earlier period than in the post-1983 period
(Table 7.4, p. 7.5); the "natural" reduction in average pre-retrofit consumption between the early and later
years is slightly larger, in fact, than the average net savings achieved by these programs during the 1980s.
This suggests that the characteristics of the remaining target population for these weatherization retrofit
programs has changed over time. In particular, there are fewer conservation opportunities in the remaining
stock of retrofit opportunities. The "low hanging fruit" may have been picked first and/or customers have
made conservation investments on their own over time in response to market forces.
Table 3 also demonstrates that it is dangerous to base cost calculations on energy savings achieved
in the first year, assuming that these savings will persist throughout the life of the investment. Table 3
indicates that, on average, the measured savings within each cohort decline (i.e. deteriorate) by roughly
10% per year over time.1 2 [Brown and White refer to a 15% average annual rate of deterioration that
is computed in a different way.]. Data are unavailable to determine whether the savings continue to
decline after the third year.
The measured cost per kWh saved calculations that we discussed earlier were based on the
assumption that energy savings measured in the first year persisted over the full life-cycle of the
conservation measures. Since the BPA studies provide evidence that these savings deteriorate over time,
the values for the cost per kWh saved reported in the first column of Tables I and 2 are too low. Given
the unexpectedly high costs of the post-1983 programs, an adjustment for the deterioration of savings over
time is important because modest increases in program costs could lead these programs to fail traditional
cost effectiveness tests. In second column of Table 1 and Table 2 we have adjusted the measured costs
per kWh saved to reflect the assumption that the present value of energy savings is 20% lower than what
is implied by the assumption that the savings persist at first year levels forever. This adjustment is
consistent with the data reported in Table 3. Readers can apply any other adjustment that they feel is
more reasonable.
An examination of Tables 1 and 2 makes it clear that adjustments in the measured costs to reflect
12 Consistent with a previous footnote, the reader may wonder whether the deterioration in savings is due to
reduced savings from installed devices, increased conservation by the control group, or other factors. The ORNL
study does not directly address this issue, so we cannot say for sure. For the 1988 program, we do have the
following data:
Year 1 Year 2
Savings Savings Difference
(kWh) (kWh) (kWh)
Participants 1773 1274 500
Control -404 -729 325
Difference 2177 2003 175
(Brown and White 1992, Table 4.5, p. 4.11)
From year 1 to year 2, savings among participants decreased, as did savings among the control group. In
this case, at least, the reduction in net savings results not from increased conservation among the control, but from
substantially lower savings by the participants.
the deterioration in measured savings over time indicates that none of the post-1983 programs were cost
effective as the cost per kWh saved exceeded BPA's 5.9 cent avoided cost ceiling price. 0
CONCLUSION
It is not our purpose to pick on the BPA program. The program has been responsibly 0
implemented in a region where electricity prices have often been too low to provide consumers with
appropriate incentives to conserve. Furthermore, the application of more comprehensive benefit-costs
techniques, rather than the simple cost effectiveness tests that have been adopted to justify utility
expenditures on conservation in the central planning world of "integrated least cost planning," could lead
to a more favorable evaluation if the reasons for the significant differences between engineering estimates
of energy savings and ex post measured savings are better understood. This is an issue, however, that we
will have to leave to another paper.
The results from the BPA program, a mature program that has followed the cost accounting and
savings measurement protocols that we have suggested, are perfectly consistent with our own study. Ex
post measured savings are 30% to 40% of ex ante engineering estimates. The measured cost per kWh
saved is much higher than was indicated in the ex ante engineering studies used for planning purposes.
Appropriate cost accounting and savings measurement does matter because it means the difference between
programs that look highly cost effective to the planner, may turn out to be wasteful when all relevant costs
and behavior are accounted for.
TABLE 1
BPA RESIDENTIAL WEATHERIZATION PROGRAM RESULTS
Most Recent Cohorts Studied
Program Cohort
1988
1989
Measured
Cost/kWh Saved
($1991 cents)
5.5
9.1
Adjusted
Cost/kWh Saved
($1991 cents)
6.9
11.4
Avoided Cost Ceiling
($1991 cents)
5.9
5.9
Measured/Estimated
Savings
0.42
0.31
Source: Computed from Brown and White (1992, p. x) with adjustments for inflation and deterioration in savings
over time as discussed in the text.
TABLE 3
MEASVRED ANNUAL KWH SAVINGS IN POST-RETROFIT YEARS
Program Cohort
Pilot (1980-82)
Interim (1982-83)
1985
1986
1988
1989
Year 1
3,840
4,200
2,610
3,060
2,180
1,330
Year 2
3,790
3,600
2,565
2,112
2,000 (-8.3%)
N/A
Year 3
3,410 (-11.2%)
2,500 (-40.5%)
2,600 (-0.4%)
2,140 (-30.1%)
N/A
N/A
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are changes from year 1 savings estimates.
Source: Brown and White (1992), Table 7.5, p. 7.7.
TABLE 2
BPA RESIDENTIAL WEATHERIZATION PROGRAM RESULTS
All Cohorts
Program Cohort
Pilot (1980-82)
Interim (1982-83)
1985
1986
1988
1989
Measured
Cost/kWh Saved
($1991 cents)
Adiusted
Cost/kWh Saved
($1991 cents)
5.5
4.0
4.4
3.2
5.2
5.3
5.5
9.1
6.5
6.6
6.9
11.4
Source: Computed from Brown and White (1992, Table 7.6, p. 7.10) with adjustments for inflation and
deterioration in savings over time as discussed in the text.
